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ABSTRACT
This paper provides new insights on the way in which the capital structure and market
power and capital structure and profitability are related. We predict and show that
capital structure and market power, as measured by Tobin’s Q, have a cubic
relationship. That is, at lower and higher ranges of Tobin’s Q, firms employ higher
debt, and reduce their debt at intermediate range. This is due to the complex
interaction of the market conditions, agency problems and bankruptcy costs. We also
show saucer-shaped relation between capital structure and profitability because of the
interplay of agency costs, costs of external financing and debt tax shield. To our
knowledge, we are the first to uncover these results.
Key words: capital structure; market structure; market power; Tobin’s Q; risk-
shifting; moral hazard; agency problems; pecking order; trade-off theory; asset
substitution.CapStrMktPower                                                                                                                                         I M Pandey
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CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND MARKET POWER
INTRODUCTION
In corporate finance, works of Modigliani and Miller (1958; 1963) about capital
structure irrelevance and tax shield advantage paved way for the development of
alternative theories and a series of empirical research on capital structure. The
alternative theories include the trade-off theory, the pecking order/asymmetric
information theory and the agency theory. All these theories have been subjected to
extensive empirical testing in the context of developed countries, particularly USA (se
Harris and Reviv, 1991 for a review). A few studies report international comparison
of capital structure determinants (Wald, 1999; Rajan and Zingales, 1995). There are
some studies that provide evidence on the capital structure determinants from the
emerging markets of South-east Asia (Pandey, 2001; Pandey et. al., 2000; Annuar and
Shamsher, 1993; Ariff, 1998). The focus of corporate finance empirical literature has
been to identify some “stylised” factors that determine capital structure.
There is relatively little evidence on the interaction between capital structure and
product market structure. Some researchers have recently started looking at this
interaction. Brander and Lewis (1986), Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), Maksimovic
(1988) and Ravid (1988) offer theoretical framework for the linkage between capital
structure and market structure. Harris and Raviv (1991) and Phillips (1995) provide
surveys of the theoretical and empirical research on the relationship between capital
structure and market structure.  The studies in USA by Krishnaswamy, Mangla and
Rathinasamy (1992), Chevalier (1993), and Phillips (1995) investigate the empirical
relationship between capital structure and market structure. In a recent study,
Rathinasamy, Krishnaswamy and Mantripragada (2000) examine this issue in
international context using data from 47 countries. All these studies establish a linear
relationship, either positive or negative, between capital structure and market
structure. We argue in this paper that the relation between capital structure and market
structure is cubic. We also show that the relation of profitability with capital structure
is U-shaped or saucer-shaped. Results of our empirical work vindicate our predictions.
To our knowledge, we are the first to uncover the cubic relation between capitalCapStrMktPower                                                                                                                                         I M Pandey
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structure and market structure and saucer-shaped relation between capital structure
and profitability. Perhaps we are also the first to carry out the empirical work on the
relationship between capital structure and market structure using data from the
emerging Malaysian market.
The remaining sections of the paper are organized as follows: Section 2 presents a
review of literature. Section 3 provides the theoretical framework. Section 4 describes
data and research methodology. Section 5 reports results of the statistical analyses.
Section 6 summarizes the main conclusions of the study.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Brander and Lewis (1986) and Maksimovic (1988) provide the theoretical framework
that links capital structure and market structure. Contrary to the profit maximisation
objective postulated in industrial organisation literature, these theories, like the
corporate finance theory, assume that the firm’s objective is to maximise the wealth of
shareholders, and show that market structure affects capital structure by influencing
the competitive behaviour and strategies of firms. Firms in the oligopolistic market
will follow the strategy of maximising their output for improving profitability in
favourable economic conditions (Brander and Lewis, 1986). In unfavourable
economic conditions, they would take a cut in production and reduce their
profitability. Shareholders enjoy increased wealth in good periods, but they tend to
ignore decline in profitability in bad times as unfavourable consequences are passed
on to lenders because of shareholders’ limited liability status. Thus, the oligopoly
firms, in contrast to firms in the competitive markets, would employ higher levels of
debt to produce more when opportunities to earn higher profits arise. The implied
prediction of the output maximisation hypothesis is that capital structure and market
structure have positive relationship.
In corporate finance, the agency costs theory supports the use of high debt, and it is
consistent with the prediction of the output maximisation hypothesis. Jensen and
Meckling (1977) argue that the shareholders-lenders conflict results into risk shifting
and wealth appropriation in favour of shareholders as they take on risky investmentCapStrMktPower                                                                                                                                         I M Pandey
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projects (asset substitution). Hence, shareholders and managers, as their agents, are
prompted to take on more borrowing to finance risky projects. Lenders would receive
interest and principal if projects succeed, and shareholders would appropriate the
residual income. However, lenders would lose if project fails. It is difficult and costly
for debt holders to be able to assess and monitor risky projects. Even debt covenants
may not be able to protect them.  In terms of the product-market decisions, the
implication of the agency theory is that firms would borrow more to pursue an
aggressive production policy that would benefit shareholders. Yet another corporate
finance theory that justifies the use of high debt is the tax-shield theory (Modigliani
and Miller, 1963). Profitable firms borrow more to save taxes since interest costs are
tax deductible. The output maximisation by oligopoly firms is supposed to increase
their profitability. Hence, both the agency cost theory and the tax-shield theory would
predict a positive relationship between capital structure and market structure.
Capital structure increases the chances of financial distress and bankruptcy. Firms
face costs of financial distress when they are unable to service debt. They will have
high debt ratios if these costs are zero or trivial (Scott, 1976; Kim, 1978). Since costs
of financial distress are non-trivial and high levered firm can actually go bankrupt,
firms with high probability of bankruptcy will have low debt ratio. The chances of
bankruptcy for firms with large reserve funds will be relatively less, but unlevered
firms with high profitability and large reserve funds would have great competitive
advantage. These firms with “deep purse” may not only survive but they would also
gain by driving their rival firms into bankruptcy (Brander and Lewis, 1986; Bolton
and Scharfstein, 1990). These firms follow a policy of aggressive production and
predatory price cut to eliminate their rivals by forcing them into financial distress.
Their strategy pays them off particularly when external funding is not available to
firms of the target predatory price behaviour. The implication of this model is that the
unlevered firm with deep purses (high profitability and reserve funds) would have
incentive to increase output to drive the competitors into bankruptcy. Empirically, we
can predict a negative relationship between capital structure and market structure.
Myers (1977) provides a model under which debt causes under-investment (asset
substitution). Firms reject those profitable, low risk investment projects that have theCapStrMktPower                                                                                                                                         I M Pandey
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possibility of passing on benefits from shareholders to lenders. Further, internal
financing is cheaper than external debt or equity financing due to asymmetric
information. Higher debt makes higher output costly for a levered firm. In a
competitive market, unlevered or low-levered rival firms will intensify competition by
increasing their output and/or lowering prices. If the levered firms continue borrowing
to meet the competition, they may face financial distress and bankruptcy. Hence, the
pecking order/asymmetric information theory predicts a negative relation between
capital structure and market power.
There are a few empirical studies that have investigated the issue of capital structure
and market structure using data of the US firms. In these studies, market structure has
been measured either in terms of price or quantity data or the Lerner index or the
Herfindahl-Hirschman index or Tobin’s Q. Krishnaswamy, Mangla and Rathinasamy
(1992) find a positive relation between debt and market structure, measured by the
Lerner index. Chevalier (1993) provides evidence in support of a negative relation
between capital structure and market structure. This result is consistent with
bankruptcy costs or the asymmetric information/pecking order hypotheses. Phillips
(1995), using price and quantity data for market structure, finds a positive link
between capital structure and market structure, consistent with the output and limited
liability effect model. In a study of international firms from forty-nine countries,
Rathnasamy, Krishnaswamy and Mantripragada (2000) also report a positive relation
between capital structure, measured by total debt ratio and long-term ratio and market
structure measured by Tobin’s Q. Their finding supports the output and limited
liability effect and agency theoretic risk-shifting model of capital structure and
product market interaction. The results also provide support for the free cash flow
model of Jensen (1986), in the form of positive relation between capital structure and
profitability.
In empirical studies of determinants of capital structure, Q ratio has also been used as
a proxy of future investment opportunities. These studies show mixed results. A
number of studies confirm a negative relationship between Q ratio and debt ratio
(Titman and Wessels, 1988; Barclay et. al., 1995; Lasfer, 1995; Rajan and Zingales,CapStrMktPower                                                                                                                                         I M Pandey
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1995; Barclay and Smith, 1996, while some find a positive relation (Michaelas et. al.
1999).
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Capital structure could be defined in different ways. In the US, it is common to define
capital structure in terms of long-term debt ratio. In a number of countries,
particularly the emerging markets, companies employ both short-term and long-term
debt for financing their assets, including current assets. It is also common for
companies in developing countries to substitute short-term debt for long-term debt
and roll over short-term debt. Hence, it is more appropriate and particularly I the
context of developing economies, to define capital structure as total debt ratio. Rajan
and Zingales (1995) argue that the definition of capital structure would depend on the
objective of the analysis For example, for agency-problem related studies, capital
structure maybe measured by total debt-to-firm value ratio. Debt could be divided into
its various components, and numerator and denominator could be measured in book
value and market value terms. In this study, we define our dependent variable –
capital structure- as total debt-to-assets (or debt-to-capital employed) is the most often
used measure of capital structure in empirical studies. Total debt includes interest-
bearing long-term and short-term debt. Assets include fixed assets and those current
assets that are financed by debt.
We define market structure in terms of market power of firms. Market power means
control of a firm over price or volume of production. In operational terms, market
power implies a firm’s monopoly, or oligopoly or competitive power. Rathnasamy,
Krishnaswamy and Mantripragada (2000) state that market structure (power) could be
measured by the Lerner index, or the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, or Tobin’s Q.
Lindenberg and Ross (1981) show that Tobin’s Q (or simply Q) is theoretically a
sound and practically the most powerful indicator of a firm’s market power. In a
competitive market, Q of all firms will be equal to one. Firms with Q higher than one
are expected to command competitive advantage either oligopoly or monopoly power.
Hence, we define market power in terms of Q. There is also a practical reason for
using this definition of market power. In developing countries, price and quantity orCapStrMktPower                                                                                                                                         I M Pandey
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segmental data are not available for measuring the Lerner index or the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index.
The theoretical definition of Q is the ratio of market value of the firm to replacement
cost of assets. It is not easy to get replacement cost data in developing countries.
Chung and Pruitt (1994) show that Q could be effectively defined as the sum of
market value of equity and book value of long-term debt and net current assets
(current assets minus current liabilities). Like Rathnasamy, Krishnaswamy and
Mantripragada (2000), we have used this measurement in our study.
The empirical studies so far have predicted a linear relationship between capital
structure and market power. We argue that this relationship could be a cubic
relationship. Our arguments are as follows. A firm in oligopoly condition sustains its
aggressive production and high-income strategy by employing higher level of debt.
Shareholders of the firm gain in terms of increased wealth. In adverse market
conditions, the limited liability provides protection to shareholders against the risky
production decision and lenders would suffer. Thus, a firm’s debt level will increase
as it gains market power reflected in Q. On the other hand, as debt increases, there are
significant costs in terms of increased probability of bankruptcy and financial distress.
This cost would be accentuated by the behaviour of no or low-debt firms with “deep
purses”. They would resort to predatory price behaviour and lead their rivals to
bankruptcy. This argument suggests a negative relationship between capital structure
and Q. These two opposing effects point to the possibility of a non-linear relationship
between capital structure and market power. As a firm starts gaining market
dominance, it will increase debt to increase its production and income. That is, as
firms’ market power increases, they employ more debt to pursue their output
maximisation strategy. This attracts rival firms to intensify competition by cutting
price and/or output. At the intermediate level of market dominance when competition
intensifies through price cut, higher costs of debt squeezes profitability of highly
levered firms and their chances of financial distress and bankruptcy increase. Levered
firms react by reducing debt or increase production through improved assets
utilisation. However, after consolidating their position, firms at higher level of market
dominance leverage the use of debt in expanding their production. Firms with strongCapStrMktPower                                                                                                                                         I M Pandey
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profitability and reserve funds and high market dominance adopt high-risk production
strategy and use more debt. Thus, we can predict a cubic relationship between capital
structure and market power. In other words, firms at relatively lower and higher levels
of market power employ more debt, while firms at intermediate level of market
dominance are vulnerable to rivals’ competitive threat and reduce their debt.
Empirical literature on capital structure finds many variables as its determinants. For
example, in a comprehensive comparative cross-country study, Rajan and Zingles
(1995) find growth, tangibility (fixed assets to total assets ratio), profitability and size
as important determinants of capital structure. Many other studies (Titman and
Wessels, 1988; Pandey, 2001; Pandey et. al. 2000; Barclay and Smith, 1996;
Castanias, 1983; Bradley, Janell and Kim, 1984) also show risk and investment
opportunity as important determinants of debt policy.
Profitability is an important independent variable that has an influence on capital
structure. As per the asymmetric information hypothesis of Myers (1977) and Myers
and Majluf (1984), firms, irrespective of their market power, would depend on
internally generated funds for their expansion since external funds involve higher
costs. This suggests a negative relationship between capital structure and profitability,
and results of empirical studies support it ((Kester, 1986; Friend and Lang, 1988;
Titman and Wessels, 1988; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Michaelas et. al., 1999). But
the alternative interest-tax shield hypothesis  (Modigliani-Miller, 1963) predicts a
positive relationship between capital structure and profitability. Jensen (1986) and
Williamson (1988) consider debt as a disciplining mechanism to ensure that managers
pay out profits rather than building their personal empires. In the Jensen model, firms
with free cash flow, or high profitability, will have higher debt. Thus, we predict that
more profitable firms will employ higher debt and will implement high output
strategy. Given these conflicting hypotheses, it is plausible to predict a non-linear
relationship between capital structure and profitability. Firms at lower levels of
profitability would employ more internal funds since external funds are expensive and
non-debt tax shields (such as depreciation) may be more than enough to take
advantage of tax benefits (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980). At higher level of
profitability, firms have more profits to shield from taxes as well as they are able toCapStrMktPower                                                                                                                                         I M Pandey
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generate more output by employing assets effectively. These firms employ more debt.
Thus, it is plausible to predict a quadratic – U-shaped- relationship between capital
structure and profitability. In fact, the relationship may be saucer-shaped. There may
be some medium range of profitability were firms may not have enough incentive to
increase or reduce debt.
According to Myers (1977) the firm’s future growth opportunities represent call
options. High growth firms may hold more options for future investments, and as such
these firms avoid issuing debt. They would like to issue equity when it is necessary in
some future date to exercise an option. Outstanding debt in such eventuality would
transfer wealth from shareholders to lenders. According to Myers’ option model and
the pecking order hypothesis of Myers and Majluf (1984), firms with high growth
should use less debt. The trade-off theory also arrives at a similar prediction. In the
event of bankruptcy caused by higher debt, the value of growth opportunities will
disappear. Thus, firms with high growth opportunities are susceptible for larger
bankruptcy costs, leading them towards low debt.
Myers (1984) points out the lack of sufficient evidence on the relationship between
capital structure and risk. According to the trade-off theory,  higher debt ratio
increases the probability of financial distress. With positive financial
distress/bankruptcy costs, the risk affects a firm’s debt ratio. Ross (1985)
demonstrates a theoretical inverse relation between cash flow beta and financial
leverage. A theoretically and empirically sound measurement of risk is the firm’s
unlevered beta. Chung (1989) shows that the relationship between capital structure
and the unlevered beta is negative. Thus, we can predict a negative relationship
between leverage and risk. However, it is shown that for a negative relationship
between risk and leverage, bankruptcy costs should be quite large (Castanias, 1983;
Bradley, Janell and Kim, 1984).
Large firms are likely to be more diversified and less prone to bankruptcy (Rajan and
Zingales, 1995). They are also expected to incur lower direct costs in issuing debt.
Thus, large firms are expected to employ higher amount of debt than small firms. The
empirical evidence is mixed. A large number of studies find a significant positive
relation between size and debt ratio (Lasfer, 1995; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; BarclayCapStrMktPower                                                                                                                                         I M Pandey
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and Smith, 1996; Berger et. al., 1997). Kester (1986) and Remmers et. al. (1974) find
no significant effect of size on capital structure.
The agency costs of debt in the Jensen and Meckling model cause owner-controlled
firms (concentrated ownership) to transfer wealth from lenders to shareholders by
investing in high-risk projects. Similarly, Myers (1977) argues under-investment in
low risk, valuable projects by owners to avoid wealth transfer from debt holders to
shareholders. Because the agency costs of under- and over-investment will be higher
for owners-controlled (concentrated ownership) firms, their debt capacity would be
lower than the managers-controlled firms (diversified ownership). Thus, we predict a
negative relationship between ownership and debt ratio.
According to trade-off hypothesis, tangible assets act as collateral and provide
security to lenders in the event of financial distress. Collaterality also protects lenders
from moral hazard problem caused by the shareholders-lenders conflict (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976). Thus, firms with higher tangible assets are expected to have high
level of debt. As regards the empirical evidence, some studies report a significant
positive relationship between tangibility and total debt (Titman and Wessels, 1988;
Rajan and Zingales, 1995).
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
We use data of companies listed on the Kuala Lumper Stock Exchange for the period
from 1993 to 2000. Our analysis covers data from 1994 to 2000 as data for year 1993
are used to calculate some variables for 1994. Companies with missing data are
excluded from the study. We also exclude the financial and securities sector
companies as their financial characteristics and use of leverage is substantially
different from other companies. We also drop companies with zero sales and negative
equity. After eliminating outliers, sample size is 208 companies for each period.  We
adjust data of those companies, which change their financial year. Such changes result
in one year with missing data and the subsequent year data of more than 12 months.
We first annualise the subsequent year data, and then substitute missing data by the
mean value.CapStrMktPower                                                                                                                                         I M Pandey
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Our estimation model uses panel data. Panel data, unlike cross-section data, allows
controlling for unobservable heterogeneity through individual (firm) effect (ηi). We
also include dummies for time variable to measure temporal effect (γt). This helps in
controlling the effect of macro-economic variables on capital structure. Thus, we use
a two-way fixed effect model as follows:
t , i i t t , i 10 t , i 9
t , i 8 t , i 7 t , i 6 t , i
2
5
t , i 4 t , i
3
3 t , i
2
2 t , i 1 0 t , i
) A / FA ( NSH   Ln
 A Ln BETA GA ) A / EBIT (
) A / EBIT ( Q Q Q ) A / TD (
ε + η + γ + α + α +
α + α + α + α +
α + α + α + α + α =
 Total debt-to-asset ratio (TD/A) at book value is our dependent variable. Independent
variables include Q ratio, profitability, growth, unsystematic risk, size, ownership
(number of shares) and tangibility. Q is calculated as the sum of market value of
equity and book value of long-term debt and net current assets (current assets minus
current liabilities). Growth (GA) is measured as one plus annual change in assets.
Profitability is defined as earnings before interest and taxes divided by assets or
capital (EBIT/A). Risk is defined as systematic risk, and it is measured by unlevered
beta. Beta for each firm is calculated using the weekly share price data. The calculated
beta for each company is unlevered for its level of leverage. Size is measured as
natural log of assets. Ownership is measured by natural log of number of outstanding
shares. It is assumed that larger number of shares imply diffused ownership.
Tangibility is defined as fixed assets divided by assets.
RESULTS
Table 1 provides means and standard deviations of the dependent and independent
variables for each year from 1994 to 2000 and for the period 1994-00. The average
total debt ratio (TDR) for the period of 1994-00 is 30%. However, TDR has been
steadily increasing over years, ranging from 24% to 35% in 2000.  Q ratio has shown
fluctuations during 1994-00. It was lower in 1997 and 1998, corresponding with the
financial and stock market crisis in Malaysia. Assets growth was quite high for the
years from 1994 to 1996; but it showed a sharp decline in the last three years.CapStrMktPower                                                                                                                                         I M Pandey
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Profitability also declined significantly in the last three years, that is, crisis and post
crisis period.
Table 2 provides correlation matrix for the pooled sample of 1456firms/years
observations
1. We find that size (ln A) and Q ratio have a significant positive
relationship with total debt ratio while risk (unlevered beta) and profitability
(EBIT/A) have a significant negative relationship. Other significant relationships exit
between risk and size and size and ownership (ln NSH). The negative relationship
between risk and size implies that the large firms, being more diversified have lower
systematic risk. The positive relationship between size and ownership indicates that
the large-sized Malaysian firms have more diffused ownership.
Table 3, column two, presents results of two-way fixed firm and time effects model.
Our main concern is to test the specification about the relationship between capital
structure (total debt ratio) and market power (Q ratio). As predicted, we find that the
coefficients of variables Q and Q
3 are positive and the coefficient of Q
2 is negative.
All these coefficients are significant at 1% level of significance, which supports a
cubic specification for the capital structure-market power relationship for Malaysian
firms. We interpret this evidence as consistent with the economic theory of output
maximisation and finance theories of agency costs and bankruptcy costs. For a given
initial range of Q ratio, any increase in this ratio leads firms to increase output and
take more risk to maximise shareholders wealth. This causes rivalry in the market and
competition intensifies, particularly from unlevered firms. The fear of bankruptcy and
loss of investment and profitability obliges levered firms to reduce debt. Hence, for
some intermediate range of Q, the competition forces levered firms to lessen debt.
Finally, for well-established, profitable firms with very high Q ratio and low
probability of financial distress and bankruptcy, the output maximisation seems to
dominate the relation between capital structure and Q ratio.
We also find expected signs of the coefficients of profitability variables, EBIT/A,
(EBIT/A)
2 and (EBIT/A)
3.The coefficients of EBIT/A and (EBIT/A)
3 are,
                                                          
1 Correlation coefficients are based on pooled OLS without controlling for individual firms and time
effects.CapStrMktPower                                                                                                                                         I M Pandey
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respectively, negative and positive and statistically significant at 1% level of
significance. The coefficient of (EBIT/A)
2 is not statistically different from zero.
Thus, our results confirm a saucer-shaped relationship between debt ratio and
profitability. We interpret this evidence as a trade-off between the effects of
asymmetric information, agency costs and tax benefits. For a given initial range of
profitability, any increase in this ratio leads firms to internally finance its output
growth and minimise cost of financing. It is also likely that at relatively lower levels
of profitability, firms may not have much incentive to issue debt, as other non-debt
tax shields may be available to them. There may also exit an intermediate range of
profitability where firms do not have sufficient incentive either to increase or decrease
any further. Finally, at higher levels of profitability and given their market power and
intensifying competition, firms will increase borrowing to expand their output. Also,
they have more profits to shield from taxes. Further, agency costs will be higher once
firms reach high levels of profitability.
The coefficients of other control variables are also statistically significant. Consistent
with option model of Myers (1977) and the pecking order hypothesis of Myers and
Majluf (1984), our results show a significant negative relation between growth and
debt ratio. We also find a negative relationship between (systematic) risk and debt
ratio. This finding is consistent with the trade-off theory. The positive relation
between size and debt ratio is evidence in favour of the hypotheses that larger firms
tend to be more diversified and less prone to bankruptcy and the transaction costs of
issuing debt is smaller. The negative relation between debt ratio and the size of
shareholding means that more diffused ownership results in lower leverage. The result
supports the agency hypothesis. Our results indicate a significant positive relation of
tangibility (FA/A ratio) with debt ratio. These results vindicate the trade-off theory
that postulates a positive correlation between debt ratio and tangibility since fixed
assets act as collateral in debt issues.
In Table 3 we also present the results of fixed firm effects models (without the time
effect). Column three gives results of fixed effect model with standard and White’s
heteroscedasticity-consistent t-values. The results of this model are similar to the two-
way fixed (firm and time) model and for all variables White’s heteroscedasticity-CapStrMktPower                                                                                                                                         I M Pandey
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consistent t-values are significant at 1% level of significance. In column four, we
provide autocorrelation corrected results of fixed effect model. We do notice that due
to autocorrelation, the estimates of variables change but our basic conclusions about
the effects the variable Q and other variables remain as predicted and generally
consistent with the fixed firm and time effect model. The estimated Hausman statistics
(H-stat.) show that fixed effect models are to be preferred over random effects model.
CONCLUSION
This study has empirically examines the relationship between capital structure and
market power using data for 208 Malaysian companies for the period from 1994 to
2000. The estimation method uses fixed firm and time effects model on panel data.
The study provides new insights on the way in which the capital structure measured
by total debt-to-assets ratio and market power measured by Tobin’s Q ratio are
related. We predict and show that capital structure and market power have a cubic
relationship. That is, at lower and higher ranges of Tobin’s Q, firms employ higher
debt, and reduce their debt at intermediate range. This is due to the complex
interaction of market conditions, agency costs, and bankruptcy costs. We also show
saucer-shaped relation between capital structure and profitability because of the
interplay of agency costs, costs of external financing and interest tax-shield. In
addition to Q ratio and profitability, we include other independent variables in our
estimation. We find that size and tangibility have a positive and growth, risk
(systematic) and ownership have a negative influence on capital structure.CapStrMktPower                                                                                                                                         I M Pandey
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 1994-00
TDR Mean 0.2472 0.2590 0.2815 0.3181 0.3493 0.3384 0.3234 0.3024
Stdev. 0.1955 0.2101 0.2122 0.2268 0.2454 0.2591 0.2623 0.2339
Q Mean 3.6590 2.9739 3.3597 1.7492 1.9531 2.5186 2.2304 2.6348
Stdev. 3.1742 1.8647 2.0160 1.8946 1.7683 3.6665 3.7663 2.7996
EBIT/A Mean 0.1417 0.1331 0.1245 0.0990 0.0483 0.0564 0.0572 0.0943
Stdev. 0.1361 0.1000 0.0987 0.0991 0.1201 0.1144 0.0871 0.1149
GA Mean 0.3191 0.4010 0.4713 0.3006 0.0870 0.0259 0.0410 0.2351
Stdev. 0.6643 0.7152 1.1802 0.5289 0.2401 0.3729 0.3422 0.6682
BETA Mean 0.9938 0.8881 1.0794 0.6194 0.6302 0.7053 0.5579 0.7820
Stdev. 0.3799 0.4004 0.5686 0.3205 0.3351 0.3579 0.3220 0.4344
LN A Mean 5.4800 5.5936 5.7111 5.8052 5.8314 5.8300 5.8308 5.7260
Stdev. 0.5138 0.5198 0.5201 0.5275 0.5461 0.5309 0.5407 0.5431
LN NSH Mean 11.7331 11.8938 12.0167 12.1065 12.1454 12.1686 12.2373 12.0430
Stdev. 1.1291 1.1231 1.1083 1.1126 1.1130 1.0973 1.0840 1.1194
FA/A Mean 0.4989 0.4777 0.4646 0.4502 0.4599 0.4695 0.4873 0.4726
Stdev. 0.2875 0.2952 0.2923 0.2772 0.2849 0.2956 0.3753 0.3025
Table 2: Correlation Matrix (1456 Firms/Years Pooled Observations)
TDR Q EBITA GA BETA Ln A Ln NSH FA/A
TDR 1.0000
Q 0.3552 1.0000
EBIT/A -0.3284 0.0895 1.0000
GA -0.3284 0.0411 0.0575 1.0000
BETA -0.3284 0.0266 0.0575 0.0034 1.0000
Ln A -0.3284 -0.0457 -0.0343 0.0255 -0.3609 1.0000
Ln NSH 0.0867 -0.0498 -0.0071 -0.0473 -0.1423 0.8716 1.0000
FA/A -0.0570 -0.0498 0.0562 -0.0887 -0.0067 -0.0936 -0.0888 1.0000CapStrMktPower                                                                                                                                         I M Pandey
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
COSTANT 0.15407 - -
t-stat 1.27212 - -
Q 0.09941 0.07745 0.06836
t-stat 25.01230* 21.42330* 18.13710*
White 15.14210*
Q^2 -0.00533 -0.00386 -0.00286
t-stat -16.23750* -12.30250* -8.97199*
White -7.43230*
Q^3 0.00008 0.00005 0.00004
t-stat 12.97960* 9.28781* 6.31756*
White 5.86061*
EBIT/A -0.41235 -0.48448 -0.30791
t-stat 7.22480* -13.17810* -8.04485*
White -12.63650*
EBIT/A -0.41235 -0.48448 -0.30791
t-stat 7.22480* -13.17810* -8.04485*
White -12.63650*
(EBIT/A)^2 -0.00715 0.02533 0.03629
t-stat -0.11967 0.40653 0.60918
White 0.40714
(EBIT/A)^3 0.40511 0.41710 0.16179
t-stat 7.22480* 7.18023* 1.83855*
White 7.67328*
GA -0.01102 -0.01877 -0.01896
t-stat -2.9121* -4.93062* -5.40571*
White -3.54391*
BETA -0.06518 -0.09395 -0.08539
t-stat -8.13451* -12.32930* -12.12980*
White -11.80150
LN A 0.33785 0.39303 0.42056
t-stat 14.95210* 18.22650* 15.70190*
White 14.83500*
LN SH -0.15953 -0.13884 -0.13932
t-stat -13.61470* -11.69060* -10.07600*
White -8.22548*
FA/A 0.07359 0.06814 0.05541
t-stat 4.45899* 3.93615* 2.98943*
White 2.95212*
Adj. R^2 0.8729 0.8600 0.8272
F-value 45.41* 41.98* 28.39*
H-stat 139.57 157.95 200.52
Obs. 1456 1456 1456
* Significance at 1% @ The coefficients of time and individual firms intercepts are not reported.